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Abstract—Major infrastructure assets are often governed by 
a mix of public and private organizations, each fulfilling a 
specific and separate role i.e. policy, ownership, operation or 
maintenance. However, it is increasingly problematic to 
maintain separate and distinct governance arrangements for 
each of these functions due to their criticality to achieving social 
outcomes such as supply of water, power and transport and 
their interdependency in terms of risk management. The success 
of long term asset management is therefore becoming reliant on 
coalitions of organizations and groups working in a 
co–coordinated and collaborative way to deliver services. Yet, it 
is unclear how to conceptualize these networks of relationships 
and to determine the types of entities and arrangements that 
will best contribute to successful collaborative governance. 
Stewardship theory is revisited to provide a lens through which 
asset management governance can be examined. It is argued 
that the concerns of the community in regard to the long-term 
sustainability of infrastructure assets from environmental, 
accountability, strategic and business perspectives may be well 
served by a renewed conceptualization of stewardship theory. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
TEWARDSHIP theory offers a lens through which to 
examine the demands upon major infrastructure asset 
managers to improve the performance of the asset, not only 
against economic measures but to meet developing public 
values of sustainability of use and intergenerational 
responsibility. Major infrastructure assets are now governed 
by a mix of public and private organization types, each 
fulfilling a specific and separate role i.e. policy, ownership, 
operation and/or maintenance. The mix of organizational 
types reflects the late 20th century heritage of economic 
rationalist reforms labeled New Public Management (NPM) 
and includes government departments, statutory 
corporations, government companies and private companies. 
NPM reforms brought efficiency to infrastructure service 
provision but through their focus on the self-interest of the 
individual organization [1] may have resulted in governance 
arrangements, organizational forms and contractual 
arrangements which do not necessarily progress 
non-economic public values and the collective ‘Public 
Interest’. Agency theory is key to that focus on the 
self-interest of the individual [2],[3] underpinning both the 
relationships between the organizations and the formal 
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contractual arrangements, typically between a government 
entity and a private sector service provider. 
Stewardship theory is different from the agency model of 
both the principal and the agent pursuing rational 
self-interested utility maximization by purporting that in 
certain circumstances the agent acts in the interests of the 
principal, even to the detriment of the agent [4], [5], [6]. 
Stewardship theory highlights the limitations of the strict 
agency model and through the framework of psychological 
and situational factors identified by [5] provides a medium 
through which the features of current infrastructure asset 
governance arrangements can be considered and offers the 
possibility of enhancing the outcomes of infrastructure asset 
management. 
The public environment of the 21st century has 
reconsidered the benefits of private sector delivery of 
services expressing concern that NPM reforms have injected 
private sector values, responsibilities and actions into the 
management of public sector delivery that are detrimental to 
public good [7]. Governance arrangements which eschew 
individual self-interest alone and look to also pursue the 
interests of other stakeholders have emerged. Relational 
contracts have been introduced for infrastructure construction 
projects [8], [7], [9] and hybrid mixes of organizations from 
the state, market and network modes [10] have demonstrated 
the capacity to both meet economic objectives and to provide 
a decision-making process which includes non-economic 
public values [1]. 
In response to this shift in strategic orientation, different 
approaches to conceptualizing the operation of new 
organizational and structural arrangements for the provision 
of public goods and services are required. Whilst research has 
begun to consider the use of new governance arrangements in 
solving ‘wicked’ social issues [10], there is also a need to 
consider the appropriateness of alternative governance 
arrangements in relation to large infrastructure assets which, 
if mismanaged, present a high risk to governments, private 
sector providers and the community. 
This paper will firstly discuss the modern public 
environment. Secondly, the forces shaping infrastructure 
stewardship will be considered. Thirdly, the notion of 
stewardship and stewardship theory and its links with agency 
theory will be explored. Fourthly, infrastructure governance 
arrangements are reviewed. Finally, opportunities for 
research which may lead to a more precise understanding of 
the emerging stewardship responsibilities of governments 
and private providers of infrastructure will be explored with 
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particular consideration given to the ways in which 
stewardship theory can be applied to assist in understanding 
current relationships between actors and the relationships 
which are seen as desirable to meet the complete stewardship 
responsibilities. 
II. MODERN PUBLIC ENVIRONMENT 
Infrastructure governance arrangements in the modern 
public environment have been formed through decades of 
reform to the roles of public sector and private sector actors. 
Current public environments were extensively reformed 
during the 1980s and 1990s. These NPM reforms were based 
on Public Choice theory which criticized public sectors as 
being monopolistic, bureaucratic and inefficient [2] [11] [7] 
for which the solution was the opening up to competition of 
previous public monopolies through activities such as 
privatization, commercialization and contracting out as well 
as the wide application of neo-liberal economic models and 
the adoption of private sector management principles. Such 
economic models and private sector management practices 
were not only applied to genuine market situations but also to 
non-market circumstances [1] and market based remedies 
were applied to public infrastructure notwithstanding 
infrastructure typically being natural monopolies [12]. 
The NPM reforms have meant that many of the values of 
private sector management have become values of the public 
sector [13] [7]. Yet governments or their entities are not 
simply required to maximize profits but rather are subject to 
political influence and are often required to meet other 
objectives, such as the public interest [14] which for the UK 
government translates to the need to have regard to other, 
shared or collective values requiring collaborative rather than 
competitive organizational forms [15]. More directly 
Beck-Jorgensen & Bozeman [16] argue that privatization and 
contracting out often have the effect of eroding public values.  
These criticisms of NPM evokes the question as to whether 
current governance arrangements for infrastructure assets 
have the capacity to perform a stewardship role that considers 
the shared values of the community and the ‘public interest’. 
Redford [17] defines the ‘public interest’ as being the best 
response to a situation in terms of all the interests and the 
concepts of value which are generally accepted by a society. 
Stone [18] builds on that definition adding the dimension of 
active pursuit of shared, collective values. This pursuit of 
collective values contrasts with the market-based (NPM) 
concept of the public interest being the sum of the 
self-interest of individuals. Recently Denhardt & Denhardt 
[1] have asserted that governments need to ensure that the 
public interest predominates through meeting democratic 
norms and values by devising solutions to public problems, 
and the processes by which such solutions are implemented. 
Meeting those additional non-economic ‘public interest’ 
values is a key challenge for infrastructure asset governance. 
Public values are relative and may even be ambiguous and 
conflicting, requiring a trade-off through judgment which 
often tends to be subjective [19]. The values underlying 
infrastructure asset management remain substantially based 
on economic rationalist principles resulting in 
‘short-termism’ i.e. profit at the expense of longevity [20]. 
Community values have strengthened in relation to the 
sustainability of use and intergenerational responsibility to be 
met by infrastructure assets. These values often conflict with 
the improved economic performance required of the asset. 
The challenge is for infrastructure governance arrangements 
to be constructed to provide decision-making mechanisms to 
both include the complete range of economic and 
non-economic values and resolve the conflict. 
III. INFRASTRUCTURE STEWARDSHIP 
Infrastructure stewardship is emerging as a feature of asset 
management practice developing in response to a 
combination of forces active across most societies. This paper 
explores those forces which are shaping the stewardship role 
so as to focus the more detailed consideration of stewardship 
and Stewardship theory discussed thus far in this paper. Asset 
management has developed a focus that has been limited to 
decisions as to the how of asset maintenance [21] particularly 
the use of information and communication technology 
systems, and e-maintenance systems [21]-[25]. This limited 
focus has been challenged with propositions that 
infrastructure asset management be strategic and 
comprehensive [26], extending from the sustainment tasks 
such as preventative maintenance and repairs to encompass 
modernization tasks such as replacement due to obsolescence 
and change-in-use modifications and disposal [27]. A further 
limitation of asset management literature [23], [28] has been 
the focus on the single organization and whether the approach 
is operational or strategic, but only within that organization. 
This need for a strategic perspective for infrastructure asset 
management has been driven by a combination of forces 
including heightening risk and accountability, financial 
reporting standards, conditional government funding and 
reducing maintenance funding [23], [28]. The response by 
asset managers to the shortage of funds has not been to 
directly resolve the funding crisis but rather to focus on 
information technology based information systems or 
decision support [29], [27]. 
IV. STEWARDSHIP 
Stewardship has a long history dating back many centuries. 
Saltman & Ferroussier-Davis [30] acknowledge the Biblical 
reference of the parable of the talents where stewardship is 
portrayed as entrusting the steward with something of value 
and the steward being obligated to improve the asset. In a 
public sector context the concept of stewardship of assets for 
the public good was a mainstay of its operation but this 
underpinning principle was supplanted in the reforms of the 
1980s with the drive to implement commercial principles as a 
public sector value. More recently stewardship as a guiding 
principle or public value has re-emerged as a response to calls 
 
 
 
to take into account the long-term effects of a broader range 
of issues such as environmental sustainability and 
intergenerational responsibilities.  
Birnberg [31] identified a hierarchical progression or 
maturity of the relationship between the steward and the 
owner of the assets in the principal-agent relationship. 
Birnberg [31] observes that the steward might merely protect 
an asset, might act to maintain the asset in its original form, 
might seek to grow the asset or might be provided with an 
asset and charged with achieving an outcome. For this latter 
model Birnberg [31] cites the example of modern 
corporations where executives are accountable to the 
shareholders, i.e. the owners, for an outcome such as profit as 
distinct from merely maintaining the specific assets. 
Stewardship principles operate in many contexts. The 
North American forest wood sector has a focus on 
sustainability over an asset which has a life-cycle with a 
timeframe similar to that of infrastructure assets. A key 
element of governance being the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) which provides a market-based certification and 
labeling scheme which adds value to the wood product from a 
marketing perspective. The FSC is a multi-stakeholder NGO 
with members from civil society, environmental groups and 
the industry supply chain. The FSC belongs to the Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) model of governance systems 
which Verdonk et al [32] note requires active, conscious 
consumers. Many infrastructure assets do not exist within a 
market with attendant consumers. 
Environmental stewardship has progressively developed 
into a form of governance [33] comprised of all forces driving 
the environment related agenda forward, including 
government regulations, economic incentives and social 
pressures. 
Stewardship theory may therefore provide a means to help 
explain the emergent view that the relationships between 
individuals and organizations are something more than 
reflections of the agency model self-interest of actors and 
help extend agency theory beyond its economic interpretation 
to include non-economic influences including the 
psychological (such as identification and power) and the 
situational (management philosophy and power) [5]. 
The key assumption of Agency theory is that directors [4], 
managers and staff [5], [6] are trustworthy and are inherently 
motivated to act in the interests of the principal, even if this is 
to the detriment of the agent as well as there being potential 
for the goals of the agent and principal to be perfectly aligned 
[5]. 
The new public environment that has been emerging for 
some time provides a counterpoint to the economic model, 
achieving an acknowledgement of a need for organizations or 
individuals to act in the ‘public interest’. The concept of 
stewardship in this context is argued to offer insights as to 
how the economic model of governance with its reliance on 
agency theory might be extended to provide a model of 
governance that facilitates the achievement of stewardship 
responsibilities. 
V. INFRASTRUCTURE GOVERNANCE  
The stewardship of infrastructure assets is currently 
performed through governance arrangements involving a mix 
of public and private organizations, each fulfilling a specific 
and separate role i.e. policy, ownership, operation or 
maintenance. This section seeks to understand the features of 
the key organizational elements of current governance 
arrangements by an examination of the traditional 
department, contracting out to private companies and Private 
Public Partnerships (PPP’s). 
The traditional department originates from the mid 19th 
century British experience. However, the newly formed 
Australian states found departments to be inappropriate for 
railway systems, development programs and commercial 
activities [34]. For these purposes statutory authorities were 
strengthened with the status of corporate bodies [35]. In the 
1980s and 1990s the use of statutory corporations for 
infrastructure was often replaced by outright privatization or, 
where the activity remained within the public sector, replaced 
by government owned companies utilizing corporations law 
passed primarily for use in the private sector [1], [36]. 
Government companies facilitated participation in level 
playing field arrangements for the conduct of government 
activities and contracting within the public sector [37]. 
An alternative to departmental provision or outright 
privatization has been the extensive use of traditional 
contracts to specify a range of contractual relationships 
between government departments (or government 
companies) and private companies. The formal private sector 
style contracts allowed government to ‘steer’ by precisely 
specifying the outputs required and terms of payment, 
allocation of risk and penalties [37]. Contracts have been 
considered key to the achievement of efficiency and 
accountability [37]. 
Traditional contracts are underpinned by agency theory 
[38] which is premised on both the principal and the agent 
being motivated by self-interest utility maximization [2], [3]. 
Agents seek to maximize their utility at the expense of the 
utility of the principal, creating a conflict of goals between 
the principal and the agent resulting in an agency cost to the 
principal [39]. 
Agency cost for infrastructure projects typically comes 
from the selection of the contractor and the monitoring of the 
contract and legal disputation (even between private 
consortium partners) [40] which all reduce the economic 
efficiency of the contracting out model and undermine the 
policy goal [41]. A recurrent, major contributor to that agency 
cost of tightly specified, traditional adversarial contracts is 
the prevalence of disputes and litigation over the performance 
of the contracted work and associated allegations of 
opportunism on the part of the private sector service 
providers [9]. These persistent significant problems with the 
 
 
 
traditional contract led to questions about the extent to which 
the needs of the public were being met and resulted in some 
cases in the introduction of ‘relational contracts’ [7], 
particularly in infrastructure construction projects [8],[7],[9]. 
These relational contracts placed an emphasis on permeable 
organizing practices intended to yield mutually beneficial 
outcomes in major infrastructure projects [8]. Inherent in this 
view is that market structure and the organizing principles of 
the quasi-market are less important than the form of 
contractual relationship and the nature of organizational form 
[7]. 
An alternative to contracting out and privatization of 
infrastructure is the PPP. These are used world-wide and are 
long-term contracts between government and private 
business for a combination of services, construction or 
financing in return for some combination of public funds, 
public assets or user fees [42]. The private element of a PPP 
may be an alliance or joint owned company which is entirely 
private sector owned, bringing complexity to PPPs and 
additional risk to the public partner 40]. 
The more common form of the PPP is that introduced 
through the UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) [42] which 
aims were to move public sector debt to the private sector and 
later to achieve value for money objectives such as on-time, 
on-budget completion or accessing scarce design expertise 
and construction skills [43]. 
A learning from PPP’s is the focus on mutual achievement 
of business objectives based on cooperation around 
respective competitive strengths, replacing the antagonistic 
public versus private dualism with harmonious, synergistic 
duality of partnership [7]. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper has re-positioned stewardship theory to provide 
an emergent model for understanding the requirements for 
the effective governance of large, critical infrastructure 
assets. 
21st century governance arrangements which minimize 
individual self-interest and pursue the interests of others have 
emerged and have demonstrated the capacity to meet both 
economic objectives and provide a decision-making process 
which includes non economic public values. The emerging 
questions are: 
1. How can the knowledge of these emerging forms of 
governance and Stewardship theory be brought 
together to conceptualize the operation of new 
organizational and structural arrangements for the 
provision of public goods and services? 
2. What are the principles to be applied in the design of 
infrastructure governance arrangements which 
promote achievement  of the complete stewardship 
outcome? 
The organizational types most prevalent in the literature 
regarding infrastructure are the traditional department, 
contracting out to private companies and Private Public 
Partnerships (PPPs). However, there are other forms 
including privately owned or government owned companies, 
statutory authorities and statutory corporations. The extent of 
the use of each type has not been explored in the literature, 
even in respect of the relatively narrow scope of a single state 
or nation nor is there an understanding of the 
decision-making that goes into choosing a governance form.  
Once the typical types of entities or mixes of entities are 
identified the relationships between component member 
entities can be examined to gain an understanding of whether 
the current governance arrangements advance, or indeed even 
allow, the steward to pursue the complete stewardship 
objective, addressing both economic and non-economic 
values. Criteria to be examined may be drawn from 
Stewardship theory, addressing dimensions such as trust, 
focus on outputs or outcomes and the perceptions of actors as 
to responsibility for the interests of others utilizing the 
models of stewardship developed by Birnberg [31]. A further 
dimension to be explored is whether asset management 
decisions are taken at only an operational level or the 
strategic decision-making level [26]. 
Stewardship theory, relational contracts and PPPs have 
each offered examples of relationships which promote the 
achievement of both shared economic values and the public 
interest. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper presented the emerging stewardship 
responsibilities of governments and private providers of 
infrastructure. The paper also considered whether new 
collaborative arrangements are capable of providing a better 
(stewardship) outcome than other models such as a single 
departmental agency carrying out all associated stewardship 
roles or the contracting out of the entire operation and 
maintenance of the asset. It is argued there is potential for 
models to be developed that mix the emerging organizational 
and contractual forms of governance. 
The contribution of these models will be important as the 
research into infrastructure governance is not advanced with 
there being a clear need for greater understanding of the 
relationships which are in play in such a wide range of 
infrastructure governance arrangements. Stewardship theory 
emerges as a powerful tool to apply to the examination of 
case studies of typical and atypical infrastructure governance 
arrangements. 
The further development of stewardship theory and 
proposed research of the current infrastructure governance 
arrangements will provide data and information to be used by 
those interested in the outcomes of infrastructure assets. 
Stewardship theory is concluded to offer insights into 
arrangements for the ‘good’ governance of infrastructure 
assets. 
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